We provide a treatise about checking proofs of distributed systems by computer using general purpose proof checkers. In particular, we present two approaches to verifying and checking the veri cation of the Sequential Line Interface Protocol (SLIP), one using rewriting techniques and one using the so-called cones and foci theorem. Both veri cations are carried out in the setting of process algebra. Finally, we present an overview of literature containing checked proofs.
Proof checkers
Anyone trying to use a proof checker, e.g. Isabelle 67, 68] , HOL 29] , Coq 20] , PVS 78], Boyer- Moore 14] or many others that exist today has experienced the same frustration. It is very di cult to prove even the simplest theorem. In the rst place it is di cult to get acquainted to the logical language of the system. Most systems employ higher order logics that are extremely versatile and expressive. However, before we can use the system, we must learn the syntax to express de nitions and theorems and we must also learn the language to construct proofs.
The second di culty is to get used to strict logical rules that govern the reasoning allowed by the proof checker. Most of us have been educated in a mathematical style, which can be best described as intuitive reasoning with steps that are chosen to be su ciently small to be acceptable by others.
We all know examples of sound looking proofs of obviously wrong facts (`1 = ?1',`every triangle is isosceles',`in every group of people all members have the same age'). In fact it is quite common that mathematical proofs contain aws. Especially, the correctness of distributed programs and protocols is a delicate matter due to their nondeterministic and discrete character. Proof checkers are intended to ameliorate this situation.
One must get rid of the sloppiness of mathematical reasoning and get used to a more logical way of inferring facts. That is to say, one should not eliminate the mathematical intuition that helps guiding the proof, as the logical reasoning steps are so detailed that one easily looses track. And if this happens, even relatively short proofs, are impossible to nd.
A typical exercise that was carried out using Coq during our rst encounters with theorem checkers, gives an impression of the time required to provide a formal proof. We wanted to show that there does not exist a largest prime number. A well known mathematical proof of this fact goes like this.
Suppose there exists a largest prime n. So, as now the product of all prime numbers exists, let it be m. Now consider m + 1. Clearly, dividing m + 1 by any prime number yields remainder 1, and therefore m + 1 is itself also a prime number, contradicting that n is the largest prime.
The formal proof requires that rst a de nition of natural numbers, the induction principle, multiplication, dividability and primality are given. Most theorem checkers contain nowadays libraries, where some of these notions, together with elementary lemmas are prede ned and pre-proven. As a second step it is necessary to construct the product m of all prime numbers up to n (it is easier to construct the product of all numbers up to n) and prove that m + 1 is not dividable by any number larger than 1. When doing this, it will turn out that the strict inductive proofs are not at all trivial, and need some thinking to nd the appropriate induction hypotheses. It took more than a full month to provide the formalized proof, and we believe this to be typical for somebody with little experience in proof checking.
However, after having mastered a theorem checker, and after having proof checked the rst theorems, the bene ts from proof checking will become very obvious. In the rst place one starts to appreciate the power of higher order logics and learns to see the di erence between a proof, which can be transformed to be checked by a proof checker, and a`proof' (or better`intuitive story') for which the relation with a logical counterpart cannot be seen. On a more concrete level, one nds in almost any proof { and correctness proofs of distributed systems or protocols are no exception { aws that even may have impact on the correctness of the protocol. A typical example is the equality between an implementation and speci cation stated on page 118 in 60] that was seen to be incorrect when a fully formalized proof was proof checked 47]. Using proof checkers can lead to a very strong emotion, which borders to addiction. As proof checkers makes one aware of ones own fallibility, which many people would not like to exhibit, the desire grows quickly to check every theorem using a proof checker. Unfortunately, proof checking is currently too time consuming to make this practical. However, the quality of proof checkers is steadily increasing meaning that from a certain point in the future proof checkers will be commonly used as they yield much more reliable proofs, and will most likely be more e cient than proving theorems by hand.
Proof checkers and concurrency
Concurrency and proof checkers are orthogonal elds. This means that proof checkers are not particularly aimed at any concurrency theory. Because we are most acquainted with proof checking within the context of process algebra, we provide a perspective from this eld. However, most of our conclusions and guidelines carry over directly to any other perspective.
There are actually three requirements that need to be ful lled for a theorem checker to be usable to check proofs of correctness of distributed systems.
1. The proof checker must be su ciently expressive to encode the concepts occurring in the concurrency theory. Higher order provers such as Coq, PVS and Isabelle satisfy these requirements. For checkers that use restricted logics, such as Larch 37] and the Boyer-Moore prover 14], it is not immediately evident that they are suitable, as many concurrency theories use higher order concepts. However, in 84] a recent mechanical veri cation of the Oral Message Algorithm is provided in ACL2 (a successor of the Boyer-Moore prover 46]), and it is argued in that paper that most features of higher order logic can be easily translated in a rst order framework. 2. The concurrency theory must have a su ciently precise logical basis and reasoning in the theory must be in a su ciently logical style. If this is not the case, one must expect to invest a lot of time providing a logical underpinning. An example from process algebra is found on page 35 of 5]. Here, the principle RSP (Recursive Speci cation Principle) is described rather sloppily bỳ a guarded recursive speci cation has at most one solution'. In 7] a formulation of this principle is given in Coq, which lls almost an entire page of various de nitions. Figure 1 : Architecture of the SLIP protocol 3. Finally, to really get a proof checker to work, the theory must be made e ective. This means that either the formal proof cannot contain a too large number of steps, which can all be entered by hand, or the proof checker allows that large parts of the proof are constructed by the checker. In one of our earliest encounters with a proof checker 8], we expanded the parallel operator into alternative and sequential composition using the standard axioms of ACP 5] . Given the large number of applications of axioms that were needed, we had to develop speci c expansion theorems.
We have spent a lot of e ort to make checking process algebraic proofs more tenable to be computer checked. This has boiled down in a method using cones and foci, which has been applied to a fully checked proof of the correctness of a distributed summing protocol 33]. Independently, an investigation into rewrite techniques has been carried out, which has been applied to the core of Philips' new Remote Control standard 36]. In the next sections we illustrate both techniques on the SLIP protocol.
The SLIP protocol
The Serial Line Interface Protocol (SLIP) is one of the protocols that is very commonly being used to connect individual computers via a modem and a phone line. It allows only one single stream of bidirectional information. This is a drawback, and therefore the SLIP protocol is gradually being replaced by the Point to Point Protocol (PPP) that allows multiple streams, such that several programs at one side can connect to several programs at the other side via one single line.
Basically, the SLIP protocol works by sending blocks of data. Each block is a sequence of bytes that ends with the special end byte. Confusion can occur when the end byte is also part of the ordinary data sequence. In this case, the end byte is`escaped', by placing an esc byte in front of the end byte. Similarly, to distinguish an ordinary esc byte from the escape character esc, each esc in the data stream is replaced by two esc characters. In our modeling of the protocol, we ignore the process of dividing the data in blocks, but only look at the insertion and removal of esc characters in the data stream. We model the system by three components: a sender, inserting escape characters, a channel, modeling the medium along which data is transferred, and a receiver, removing the escape characters (see gure 1). We let the channel be a bu er of capacity one in this example.
We use four data types N, Bool, Byte and Queue to describe the SLIP protocol and its external behaviour. The sort N contains the natural numbers. With 0 and S we denote the zero element and the successor function on N. Numerals (e.g. 3) are used as abbreviations. The function eq : N N ! Bool is true when its arguments represent the same number. The sort Bool contains exactly two constants t (true) and f (false) and we assume that all required boolean connectives are de ned.
The sort Byte contains the data elements to be transferred via the SLIP protocol. As the de nition of a byte as a sequence of 8 bits is very detailed and actually irrelevant we only assume about Byte that it contains at least two not necessarily di erent constants esc and end, and a function eq:Byte Byte ! Byte that represents equality. Using a proof checker, we can nd out that we indeed did not need any other assumption on bytes.
3 THE SLIP PROTOCOL 4 Furthermore, to describe the external behaviour of the system, we introduce a sort Queue which we describe in slightly more detail to avoid the typical confusion that occurs with less standard data types.
Queues are constructed using the empty queue ; and the constructor in : Byte Queue ! Queue. This means that we can apply induction over queues using these functions. Furthermore, we use the following auxiliary functions: toe:Queue ! Byte, untoe:Queue ! Queue, len:Queue ! N, empty; full:Queue ! Bool
The function toe yields the element that was rst inserted in the queue. The function untoe removes this element from the queue. We leave these functions unde ned on the empty queue, as we do not require this information. The function len yields the length of the queue, empty says when the queue is empty and full yields a later to be explained criterion for what it means for a queue to be full. We provide below the precise description of the SLIP protocol. For this we use process algebra with data in the form of CRL ( 5, 34] ). The processes are de ned by guarded recursive equations for the channel C, the sender S and the receiver R (cf. Figure 1) . The equation for the channel C expresses that rst a byte b is read using a read action via port 1, and subsequently this value is sent via port 2. After this the channel is back in its initial state, ready to receive another byte. The encircled numbers can be ignored for the moment. They serve to explicitly indicate the state of these processes and are used later.
Using the r action the sender reads a byte from a protocol user, who wants to use the service of the SLIP protocol to deliver this byte elsewhere. Using the two armed condition p / c . q, which must be read as if c then p else q, it is obvious that if b equals esc or end rst an additional esc is sent to the channel (via action s 1 ) before b itself is sent. Otherwise, b is sent without pre x.
The receiver is equally straightforward. After receiving a byte b from the channel (via r 1 ) it checks whether it is an esc. If so, it removes it and delivers the trailing end or esc. Otherwise, it just delivers b. Both the sender and the receiver repeat themselves inde nitely, too.
In the fourth equation the SLIP protocol is de ned by putting the sender, channel and receiver in parallel. We let the actions r 1 and s 1 communicate and the resulting action is called c 1 . Similarly, r 2 and s 2 communicate into c 2 . This is de ned using the communication function by letting (r i ; s i ) = c i for i = 1; 2. The encapsulation operator @ fr1;s1;r2;s2g forbids the actions r 1 , s 1 , r 2 and s 2 to occur on their own by renaming these actions to , which represents the process that cannot do anything. In this way the actions are forced to communicate. The hiding operation fc1;c2g hides these communications by renaming them to the internal action . Using axioms x = x and x+ x = x in weak bisimulation 60], or x ( (y + z) + z) = x (y + z) in branching bisimulation 5], the description of systems can be reduced, making obvious what the external behaviour of a system is. For the SLIP protocol the external actions are r and s that respectively read bytes to be transferred and delivers these bytes. We want to obtain a better understanding of the protocol, because although rather simple, it is not straightforward to understand its external behaviour completely. Data that is read at r is of course delivered in sequence at s without loss or duplication of data. So, the protocol behaves like a kind of queue. The reader should now, before reading further, take a few minutes to determine the size of this queue 1 . Actually, the protocol behaves as a queue of size three, as long as there are no esc and end bytes being transferred. Simultaneously, one byte can be stored in the receiver, one in the channel and one in the sender. If an esc or end is in transfer, it matters whether it occurs at the rst or second position in the queue. At the rst position the esc or end is ultimately neatly stored in the receiver, taking up one byte position, allowing two other bytes to be simultaneously in transit. If this esc or end occurs at the second position, there must be a leading esc in the channel C, and the esc or end itself must be in the sender. Now, there is no place for a third byte. So, the conclusion is that the queue behaves itself as a queue of size three, except when an esc or end occurs at the second position in the queue, in which case the size is two. This explains the full predicate de ned above, and yields the description of the external behaviour of the SLIP protocol below: If the queue is not full, an additional byte b can be read. If the queue is not empty an element can be delivered. where`=' is interpreted as being branching or weakly bisimilar. In Section 4 below we prove Theorem 3.1 directly using process algebraic axioms and rewriting techniques to make this approach tenable for proof checkers. In Section 5 we apply the cones and foci theorem and check the set of rather straightforward preconditions in PVS. The checked proofs can be obtained by contacting the authors. 4 Using rewrite systems in Isabelle/HOL The direct proof method in process algebra consists of three steps:
1. Unfold the implementation by repeatedly calculating its rst step expansion. This results in a system of guarded recursive equations. 2. Shrink this system by using the laws of weak (or branching) bisimulation. 3. Prove that the speci cation obeys the smaller set of equations.
The RSP-principle then guarantees that the speci cation and implementation are equal.
The bunch of work is in the rst step expansion. Given a process I H (S k C k R) this is of the form P i a i I H (S i k C i k R i ), with a i the possible rst steps of the process. The process S i denotes the sender after performance of a i . The rst step expansion must be repeated for the derivatives I H (S i k C i k R i ). In this way, the computation tree of a process can be unfolded. To avoid an in nite unfolding of the process, names are introduced. These names can be used for sharing parts of the tree. The procedure of expansion is continued until a closed system of guarded equations is found. The introduction of new names and the criterion to terminate the unfolding remains the creative part of the proof.
The rst step expansion is rather straightforwardly calculated using the axioms of process algebra. However, due to the large number of applications of axioms automation is desired. In Section 4.2 we will present a conditional higher-order rewrite system that given a parallel process computes its rst-step expansion, without running into exceedingly large intermediary terms. But rst we provide the laws of process algebra and its implementation in Isabelle/HOL. The method is applied to the SLIP protocol in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
Formulation of Process Algebra in Isabelle
In Isabelle, terms have types, and the types are contained in classes. We introduce new classes act and data, and a communication function gamma. Here act is the class of action alphabets on which gamma is well-de ned, and data is the class of types that may occur as data types in the processes. Given an alphabet 'a::act, a type constructor 'a proc is declared for the processes over the (polymorphic) alphabet 'a. After that, the process algebra operators are declared, and in x notation is introduced. We use ++, **, ||, !!, LL for alternative, sequential, parallel composition, communication and left merge, respectively. Furthermore, delta, tau, enc and hide are used for , , encapsulation and hiding. a<e> denotes atomic action a with data element e, and $ d::
Finally, this approach uses the iterative construct y @@ z instead of the recursive de nition x = yx+z. in traditional notation this is written y z, meaning that y is repeated zero or more times, and then z is executed. Recursive de nitions would introduce new names (x), that must be manually folded and unfolded during proofs. As an example, the type of the summation operator is as follows:
$ :: 'd::data => 'a::act proc] => 'a proc Here 'd and 'a are type variables, restricted to class data (for data types) and act (for action alphabets), respectively. Finally, the axioms of process algebra are turned into rules for Isabelle/HOL. Below we give an exhaustive list of the axioms we used. Note that we work with weak bisimulation which is slightly easier than branching bisimulation in the direct proof method. The conditions gamdef a b c and gamundef a b can be read as (a; b) = c and (a; b) is unde ned, respectively.
A1 "x ++ y = y ++ x" A2 "(x ++ y) ++ z = x ++ (y ++ z)" A3 "x ++ x = x" A4 "(x ++ y) ** z = x ** z ++ y ** z" A5 "(x ** y) ** z = x ** y ** z" A6 "x ++ delta = x" A7 "delta ** x = delta" D1 "(~a mem H) --> enc H (a<d>) = a<d>" D1d "enc H delta = delta" D2 "a mem H --> enc H (a<d>) = delta" D3 "enc H (x ++ y) = enc H x ++ enc H y " 7 D4 "enc H (x ** y) = enc H x ** enc H y "
tau1 "x ** tau = x" tau2 "x ++ tau ** x = tau ** x" TI1 "~a mem H --> hide H (a<e>) = a<e>" TI1d "hide H delta = delta" TI2 "a mem H --> hide H (a<e>)=tau" TI3 "hide H (x ++ y) = hide H x ++ hide H y" TI4 "hide H (x ** y) = hide H x ** hide H y"
BKS1 "x @@ y = x ** (x @@ y) ++ y"
A rewrite system for the expansions
In order to nd the rst step expansion of a term, we have to apply the laws of process algebra with care. Many of these laws (regarded as rewrite rules) make copies of subterms leading to an unnecessary blow-up of intermediate terms (cf. CM1). Rather than programming a rewrite strategy in the theorem prover, we enlarge the usual rewrite rules with the context in which they may be applied. In this way we can control the application of the duplicating rewrite laws.
The essence of our strategy is to avoid the generation of many subterms that will eventually be encapsulated. We assume that the subterm to be expanded is of the shape enc H (2++p). Here 2 can be seen as the head and p as the tail of the list of summands to be processed. The rewrite rules are found by case analysis on the form of 2. We will make sure that the duplication of subterms can only take place in the head of the term. The encapsulation is used to remove idle subterms as quickly as possible.
In order to start the system, a term enc H (x || y || z) rst has to be transformed into enc H (x || y || z ++ delta). The rewrite system then starts with the following rule:
enc H (x||y ++ p) = enc H (x LL y ++ x !! y ++ y LL x ++ p).
From now on the general shape will be enc H (2 LL u ++ p), so we need an analogon of the previous rule:
2 is either a single component or the communication between two components. These cases are dealt with by the following non-duplicating rules: CM2, CM3, CM5, CM6, CM7, CF1, CF2 and CF2' (and possibly their symmetric counterparts). Only the rules for alternative components (CM4, CM8 and CM9) are duplicating and have to be replaced by e.g.:
Eventually, the rst summand is so small that it either can be discarded by the conditional rewrite rule a mem H ==> enc H (a<d> ** x ++ p) = enc H p, or it contributes to the nal result. In that case we applỹ a mem H ==> enc H (a<d> ** x ++ p) = enc H p ++ a<d> ** enc H x, in order to proceed with the next summand, which is the head of p. The summation symbols ($) are pulled to the front of the individual summands, using rules S4, S5, S6, S7 and its symmetric variant S7'. Eventually, a lot of summation signs can be eliminated after communication takes place, by adding rules like
As the latter rule is non-duplicating, we don't need the encapsulation context to steer its application. The iteration construct is only unfolded in certain contexts, such as
Finally, conditionals are pulled to the top of the terms by rules of the form:
The complete set of rewrite rules can be found in the appendix. These rules have been proven in Isabelle using a much simpler rewrite system (basically the completion of the process algebra laws, cf. 1]). The rules have been gathered in a simpli cation set called expand ss. Also tactics to automatically prove side conditions like a 2 H and gamdef a b c have been put into this simpli cation set. Finally, a tactic choose is de ned, which (non-deterministically) applies the rule enc H p = enc H (p ++ delta), in order to bring the term into the required shape. Using backtracking, the user can really choose which terms to expand.
Representation of the SLIP protocol
First, we have to de ne the alphabet of the SLIP protocol. We also de ne the communication-function gamma and state that Act, (in combination with gamma) is of class act. The latter yields some proof obligations that we now omit.
datatype Act = r | r1 | c1 | s1 | r2 | c2 | s2 | s rule gamma_def "gamma == (r1,s1,c1), (r2,s2,c2), (s1,r1,c1), (s2,r2,c2)]" instance Act::act Next we de ne the data types of the SLIP protocol. We deviate from the CRL-speci cation, by using the lists from the Isabelle library, with hd, tl, @ (head, tail and append) instead of queues with toe and untoe. We are now ready to de ne the protocol itself. Because we can now use iteration we don't need axioms but only de nitions. For brevity we omit the types.
else s<d>)) @@ delta" "Slip == hide TL (enc HL (S || C || R))"
Veri cation of the SLIP protocol
With the machinery developed so far we can start the veri cation of the SLIP protocol. To this end we rst de ne a number of auxiliary process terms. (if (special e) then (s1<ESC>**s1<e>) else s1<e>)**S||C||s<d>**R))" "Slip3 d == hide TL (enc HL ( S || C || s<d> ** R))" "Slip4 d == hide TL (enc HL (s1<d> ** S || s2<ESC> ** C || R))" "Slip5 d == hide TL (enc HL (S || s2<d> ** C || R))" "Slip6 d e f == hide TL (enc HL ( (if (special f) then (s1<ESC> ** s1<f>) else s1<f>) ** S || s2<e> ** C || s<d> ** R))"
We follow the three steps of the classical correctness proof. First the SLIP protocol is expanded. The rst command unfolds the de nitions in the left-hand side of the equation. The next command places the condition as an assumption in the context. Then one of the enc's is chosen and expanded using the expand ss-system. This is repeated for a second expansion. Note that the default choice of the system was wrong so we had to backtrack. After that we unfold the de nitions in the righthand side. Then we call the rewrite system for hiding, tau ss. Finally the left-and right-hand side are compared. The latter step uses laws for commutativity of the alternative (A1) and parallel composition. Isabelle will not loop on such rules because it uses ordered rewriting. By doing some subtle substitutions in the equations above and using the tau-laws (tau1, tau2) and the derived law (x+y)+x = (x+y), we reduce the system to the following set of equations. These equations form a system of guarded recursive equations, of which Slip is a solution. Finally by RSP, Slip = Spec ], but we didn't carry out this nal step in Isabelle, as it would require quite a lot of extra formalization.
Using cones and foci in PVS
If protocols become more complex, it is not enough to resort to automating basic steps, but one must resort to e ective meta theorems. As an example we present here the cones and foci theorem or general equality theorem 35, 33] , and explain the formalisation of Theorem 3.1 and its proof in PVS (see 78]). The basic observation underlying this method is that most veri cations follow basically the same structure. The cones and foci theorem circumvents those veri cation steps that are similar and focuses on the parts that are di erent for each veri cation.
However, in order to be able to formulate such a general theorem, the format of processes as being used up till now is too general. Therefore, we introduce the so called linear process equation format to which large classes of processes can be automatically In 9] an LPE is de ned as having also summands that allow termination. We have omitted these here, because they hardly occur in actual speci cations and obscure the presentation of the theory.
LPEs are de ned here having a single data parameter. The LPEs that we will consider generally have more than one parameter, but using cartesian products and projection functions, it is easily seen that this is an inessential extension.
Finally, we note that sometimes (and we actually do it below) it is useful to group summands per action such that i2I can be replaced by a2Act where Act is the set of action labels. Such LPEs are called clustered, and by introducing some auxiliary sorts and functions, any LPE can be transformed to a clustered LPE (provided actions have a unique type).
We call an LPE convergent if there are no in nite -sequences: We obtained this form, by identifying three explicit states in the sender and receiver, and two in the channel. As we can obtain a linear equation for the SLIP protocol algorithmically, we do not think it useful to consider this aspect of the veri cation amenable for proof checking. Therefore, the following lemma has not been proof checked. We list below a number of invariants of LinImpl that are su cient to prove the results in the sequel. The proof of the invariants is straightforward, except that we need invariant 2 to prove invariant 3. 
8a 2 Act n f g 8e a :E a (b a (d; e a ) ! h(g a (d; e a )) = g 0 a (h(d); e a )) (6) Criterion (1) says that the implementation must be convergent. In e ect this does not say anything else than that in a cone every internal action constitutes progress towards a focus point. In 35] also an extension of this method where convergence of the implementation is not necessary is presented.
Criterion (2) says that if in a state d in the implementation an internal step can be done (i.e. b (d; e ) is valid) then this internal step is not observable. This is described by saying that both states relate to the same state in the speci cation.
Criterion (3) says that when the implementation can perform an external step, then the corresponding point in the speci cation must also be able to perform this step. Note that in general, the converse need not hold. If the speci cation can perform an a-action in a certain state e, then it is only necessary that in every state d of the implementation such that h(d) = e an a-step can be done after some internal actions. This is guaranteed by criterion (4). It says that in a focus point of the implementation, an action a in the implementation can be performed if it is enabled in the speci cation.
Criteria (5) and (6) express that corresponding external actions carry the same data parameter (modulo h) and lead to corresponding states. Using the matching criteria, we would like to prove that, for all d:D p , C p;q;h (d) implies p(d) = q(h(d)). This can be done using the following theorem. Only now we come to the actual checking of this protocol in PVS. We concentrate on proving the invariant and the matching criteria. We must choose a representation for all concepts used in the proof. As this would make the paper too long, we only provide some de nitions and highlight some steps of the proof, giving a avour of the input language of PVS.
We start o de ning the data types. We use as much of the built-in data types of PVS as possible. The advantage of this is that we can use all knowledge of PVS about these data types. A disadvantage is that the semantics of the data types in PVS may di er from the semantics of data types in the protocol, leading to mismatches between the computerized proof and the intended proof.
The types N and Bool are built in types of PVS and need not be de ned. We declare Byte to be a nonempty type, with two elements esc and endb (end is a prede ned symbol and can therefore not be used). For queues we take the built in type list and parameterize it with bytes. The type of the parameters of the linear implementation and the speci cation are now given by DX and DY respectively. The type upto(n) denotes a nite type with natural numbers up to and including n. A function such as untoe can now be de ned in the following way:
untoe(q:Queue):RECURSIVE Queue=if null?(q) then null else if null?(cdr(q)) then null else (cons (car(q),untoe(cdr(q)))) endif endif MEASURE(lambda(q:Queue) : length(q))
The function car, cdr and null are built in PVS. The MEASURE statement is added to help PVS nding criteria for the well-foundedness of the de nition, which is in this case obtained via the length of the queue.
Below we show how a linear process equation is modeled. In essence the information contents of an LPE is the set D, the index set I, the sets E i , the actions a i and the function f i , g i and b i .
We only provide the LPE representation for the linear implementation of the SLIP protocol. The set D is given as DX de ned above. We group all -actions, which leaves us with three summands. We assume this a priori (and have even encoded this bound in all theorems) as making it more generic would make the presentation less clear. Using the knowledge that there are only three summands, we can de ne the sets E i very explicitly: E1:TYPE=Byte, E2:TYPE=upto(0) and E3:TYPE=upto(3).
Here, upto(0) is a set with exactly one element. Furthermore E3 is taken to contain the numbers 0; : : :; 3 to refer to the di erent actions in the linear implementation.
The constituents of the di erent summands are given by the record elds u1, u2 and u3. The notation (#u1:=...,u2:=...,...#) stands for a record with elds u1, etc. Each summand consists again of a record. The rst eld of this record gives the name of an action (in PVS we have de ned ra for r, sa for s and tau for ). The second, third and fourth components are the functions f i , g i and b i . (lambda (st:upto(3)) : if st=0 then (bs,2,esc,1,br,sr) else if st=1 then (bs,0,bs,1,br,sr) else if st=2 then (bs,ss,bc,0,bc,1) else (bs,ss,bc,0,bc,2) endif endif endif)), b:=(lambda (bs:Byte,ss:upto(2),bc:Byte,sc:upto(1),br:Byte,sr:upto(2)):
(lambda (st:upto(3)) : if st=0 then (sc=0 and ss=1 and (bs=endb or bs=esc)) else if st=1 then (sc=0 and (ss=2 or (ss=1 and not(bs=endb or bs=esc)))) else if st=2 then (sr=0 and sc=1) else (sr=1 and br=esc and sc=1) endif endif endif))#) #)
Below we provide a PVS description of what it means to be an invariant for a predicate I on a given LPE, and we formulate the general equation theorem. Here Sol(lpox) yields the solution of an LPO lpox. We turned the general equation theorem (Thm. 5.8) into an axiom, as our current aim is not to verify theoretical results. 
Here seq, tau, condi stand for the sequential operator , the process and the conditional construct, respectively. Moreover, Convx,Crit2,...,Crit6 represent the six criteria of De nition 5.7 and FC the focus condition and lpoy: ALPE DY] is an LPO without -actions.
The state mapping stmapp can be formalized in PVS in a very straightforward way (but we rst de ne cadd): To assert the MAINTHM theorem described below in PVS corresponding to the main Lemma 5.9, GET is to be applied with the following instantation L IMPL, L Spec, stmapp, Inv where Inv is an encoded expression of the invariants de ned in Lemma 5.5. After application of GET theorem one is confronted with a long list of proof obligations. They could be proved with several seperate lemmas. To get an impression of how they look like, we provide below the lemma that corresponds to the sixth matching criterion. It has been proven using the built in grind tactic.
Inv(bs,ss,bc,sc,br,sr) => (ss=0 => stmapp(b,1,bc,sc,br,sr)=cons(b,stmapp(bs,ss,bc,sc,br,sr))) AND ((sr=2 or (sr=1 and br/=esc)) => stmapp(bs,ss,bc,sc,br,0)=untoe(stmapp(bs,ss,bc,sc,br,sr)))
After having proved the whole list of obligations, we can conclude:
MAINTHM : THEOREM forall (b1,b2,b3: Byte) : Sol(L_Impl)(b1,0,b2,0,b3,0)=Sol(L_Spec)(null)
6 Which proof checker to use?
This is an obvious question that is not easy to answer. We only have substantial experience with Coq, Isabelle and PVS, and only tried some others. The conclusion is that none of the checkers is perfect and all are suited for the veri cation of correctness proofs of protocols. PVS has large built in libraries and has the largest amount of ad hoc knowledge and specialised decision procedures. This makes it an e cient theorem checker and relatively easy to use for beginners. However, it is not always obvious what the procedures do, hindering fundamental understanding of how the prover achieves its results. Moreover, these built-in procedures operate unchecked, and therefore may erroneously prove a lemma. There is no independent check in the system. Regularly, problems or bugs are reported, which are dealt with adequately.
Coq has by far the nicest underlying theory, which is not very easy to understand, however. Coq uses a strict separation between constructing a proof and checking it. Actually, using the Curry-Howard isomorphism, a term (=proof) of a certain type (=theorem) is constructed using the vernacular of Coq. After that the term and type are sent to a separate type checker, which double checks whether the term is indeed of that type, or equivalently the proof is indeed a proof of the theorem. In a few rare cases we indeed constructed proofs that were incorrect, and very nicely intercepted in this way. This gives Coq by far the highest reliability of the provers.
A disadvantage of Coq is that it is relatively hard to get going. This is due to the fact that the theory is di cult, and there are relatively few and underdeveloped libraries. Furthermore, automatic proof searching is less supported in Coq then in PVS and Isabelle.
Isabelle is the most di cult theorem prover to learn. This is due to the fact that the user must have knowledge of the object logic (HOL, but there are others) and the metalogic (Higher order minimal logic). An advantage of this two level approach is that proof search facilities have a nice underpinning in the meta logic. These facilities include backtracking, higher order uni cation and resolution. Although there are no proof objects that are separately checked such as in Coq, Isabelle operates through a kernel, making it much more reliable than PVS. Term rewriting is an exception, as it has been implemented outside this kernel for e ciency reasons, but it is very powerful as ordered conditional higher-order rewriting is implemented, and rather e cient. Temporal logic has been mainly used for proving safety (invariance) properties and liveness (eventuality) properties of concurrent systems. The temporal logic of actions (TLA), developed by Lamport 50] , allows systems and properties to be described in the same language. The semantics of TLA has been formalized in the HOL theorem checker 29] in 81] and a mutual exclusion property for an increment example and the re nement of a speci cation were proven and the proof was checked.
In 22], a translator was devised to directly translate TLA into the language of Larch Prover 37]. Examples veri ed in this approach are an invariance property of a spanning tree algorithm 22], correctness of an N-bit multiplier 21]. TLA has also been applied for specifying and verifying an industrial retransmission protocol RLP1 (Radio Link Protocol) in 61] of which the proofs were checked with the theorem prover Eves 28] .
A subset of the temporal formalism of Manna and Pnueli 59] has been encoded in the BoyerMoore prover by Russino in 74] in order to mechanically verify safety and liveness properties of concurrent programs. He applied this system to check several concurrent algorithms of which the most di cult was the Ben-Ari's incremental garbage collection algorithm 75]. Furthermore, Goldschlag encoded the Unity formalism in the Boyer-Moore prover in 26, 27] . Unity, developed by Chandy and Misra 15], is a programming notation with a temporal logic for reasoning about the computations of the concurrent programs. To illustrate the suitability of the proof systems, Goldschlag respectively speci ed and proved the correctness of a solution to mutual exclusion algorithm, the solution of the dining philosopher's problem, a distributed algorithm computing the minimum node value in a tree and an n-bit delay insensitive FIFO queue. We can also mention that a distributed minimal spanning tree algorithm 23] was veri ed 41] using the Boyer-Moore theorem checker in the pre-post condition style; the last author also veri ed the PIF algorithm 42]. Finally, in the same manner a distributed memory management algorithm has been checked mechanically in 31].
The Unity community has also used the Larch Prover to study a communication protocol over faulty channels 16] . The informal proof of safety and liveness properties of the protocols given in 15] have been computer checked revealing some aws. Unity has been implemented in other theorem checkers as in 17] where an industrial protocol is being studied.
Various protocols have been studied based on Input/Output automata proposed by Lynch and Since several years, numerous protocols have been checked in the eld of security systems whith modal logic or general purpose formal methods. Among many checked cryptographic protocols, the protocols 6, 69, 70] were proved using Isabelle and the protocols 4, 11] were proved with Coq.
Examples of protocols or distributed systems have also been veri ed in a combination of theorem proving and model checking. These rules can be easily proved from the axioms, apart from associativity of ||. The latter requires a lot of sophisticated applications of the laws of standard concurrency. In Isabelle, this proof heavily depends on ordered rewriting with the appropriate rules and backtracking. These rules follow easily from the axioms, apart from the fourth and fth. The latter require a case distinction on whether d = e and whether (a; b) is de ned or not. All cases are easy. Delta contraction rules: delta ** x = delta delta ++ x = x enc H delta = delta delta !! x = delta x !! delta = delta
The latter two follow from SC6 and the Handshaking axiom. The other rules are simply derivable.
A.2 Extension with the in nite sum operator
We now distinguish between rules that distribute the sum-operator, rules that eliminate it, and analogons of ACP-rules for the sum-operator. Rules that distribute the sum: These rules are such that the sum-operator is pulled to the front of the individual summands. These rules can easily be proved from the axioms. Rules that eliminate the sum: The rules found so far form one rewrite system, able to compute the rst step expansion of a process.
A.5 Hiding
The following rules are used for hiding. These set of rules are not seen as extension to the previous rewrite systems, but as a separate rewrite system. In practice, rst a number of expansions will be done, and only then the hiding tactic is invoked once. 
